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COMPARISON OF NAVY AND AIR FORCE ADMIN-
ISTRATIVE AND DISCIPLINARY DISCHARGES

Robert A. Stephan, et al

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Research Contribution 218


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**Institute of Naval Studies
Research Contribution 218**

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ADMINISTRATIVE AND DISCIPLINARY DISCHARGES**

July 1972

**Robert A. Stephan, Cdr., U.S.N.
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ABSTRACT

Navy administrative and disciplinary loss rates are examined to determine the effect of mental group and education mix. Navy and Air Force disciplinary and administrative discharge rates are compared. Costs associated with the administration of the Navy's disciplinary system are developed. A methodology is presented for determining the cost of Navy first termers discharged prior to the expiration of active obligated service.

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COMPARISON OF NAVY AND AIR FORCE ADMINISTRATIVE AND DISCIPLINARY DISCHARGES¹

SUMMARY

During recent years, the Air Force has recorded discharges for disciplinary and administrative reasons at a rate of approximately one-third that of the Navy. Preliminary investigations posed a number of hypotheses for the differences in rates including enlistment standards, conditions of service, and policies regarding administrative and disciplinary discharges. Previously available data have proved insufficient to substantiate the specific effects of any of these possible contributing factors.

The results established in this study were:

(a) Recruit education mix was a major determining factor in explaining approximately 50 percent of the difference in Air Force and Navy loss rates.

(b) The difference in categorization of losses by each service helped to account for most of the remaining difference in loss rates.

Initially we sought to investigate possible differences in disciplinary rates aboard ship as compared to shore stations. A demonstrated difference would have lent credence to the hypothesis that the conditions of service affect discharge rates. Unfortunately, Navy loss tapes do not reliably indicate the last permanent duty station, and therefore the effect of service conditions could not be readily gauged.

Appendix A contains cost data associated with the administration of the Navy's disciplinary system. Equivalent cost information for the Air Force was not available and therefore a between-service comparison was not feasible. This data, however, does present representative costs of various types of courts-martial and could be used to evaluate potential costs or savings of dollars and/or man-hours resulting from the implementation of policies affecting judicial action.

This study also examined the costs associated with replacing personnel discharged prior to the expiration of their active obligated service (EAOS). We first used historical data to examine the magnitude of the problem associated with premature discharges for administrative and disciplinary reasons. Then we devised a methodology for quantifying the costs associated with the discharge and replacement of an individual at various points in his first enlistment.

¹The authors wish to express appreciation to the U.S. Air Force and particularly to the officers of the Management and Procedures Branch, Military Personnel Center, Randolph AFB, whose whole-hearted cooperation made this investigation possible.

RECOMMENDATIONS

The following recommendations are implicit in this report and are summarized here for ease of reference:

- (1) Compile data regarding accessions and losses by cohort (accession group) on at least a quarterly basis. Data should include education, General Classification Test score (GCT), Armed Forces Qualification Test score (AFQT), DoD loss code, race, last permanent duty station for losses, and other data deemed appropriate by potential users.
- (2) Require recruiting stations to submit reports indicating characteristics of rejects with regard to at least mental group, race, and education.
- (3) Utilize the above data to update the "Odds for Effectiveness" and monitor recruiting effectiveness. This monitoring could be accomplished by an analysis group within the Navy Recruiting Command.
- (4) Initiate psychometric research with a view toward
 - a. better screening methods to eliminate more of the poor risks at the recruiting station, and
 - b. increased utilization of the lower mental groups by revising school eligible criteria, especially with regard to minority group members.
- (5) Examine disciplinary discharge policies (possibly through administrative review of Air Force policies) to determine whether the Navy can successfully substitute more of the less expensive, less stigmatizing categories.
- (6) Review Navy policy regarding pre-trial restraint in an attempt to reduce the prisoner load on correction facilities.

DATA

Results of this study were based on data supplied by the Bureau of Naval Personnel and Air Force Headquarters, Randolph Air Force Base.

Navy loss data were obtained from the loss tapes for fiscal years 1969-1971. These tapes contained separations indicating length of service, education, GCT, AFQT, and DoD loss codes. Navy accession data for fiscal years 1967-1970 contained information on education and mental group, but not on race. AFQT was unavailable in some cases, and therefore GCT was used to estimate the appropriate mental groups.

Air Force loss data contained separations for fiscal years 1968-1970 indicating length of service, mental group, race, and DoD loss codes, but no information on education. Air Force accession data for fiscal years 1968-1970 contained information by race, education, and mental group.

Since cohort loss data did not exist, these losses were estimated by relating accession data to loss data using length of service as an indicator of cohort populations. A lag in reporting losses further complicated the problem.

Although we originally desired to compare discipline and discharge rates in the Navy for ship- and shore-based personnel, we found that this was impossible since the last permanent duty station is not recorded on the loss tapes. Hence, it was impossible to determine whether the offense resulting in loss or disciplinary action occurred while the individual was assigned to a ship or shore station.

ANALYSIS OF LOSS RATES

The most significant result of this part of the analysis is that mental group per se has very little to do with the disciplinary rate. The widespread erroneous assumption is that people with the lower AFQT scores (Mental Group IV's) cause more than their share of the military's disciplinary problems. When one looks at the raw statistics this does appear to be the case. Take, for example, the following 2-year loss rates of 1968 and 1969 accessions.

TABLE 1
NAVY 2-YEAR LOSS RATES

Mental group	I	II	III	IV
1968 accessions	0.054	0.066	0.112	0.141
1969 accessions	0.065	0.065	0.09	0.148

It is understandable that a personnel manager faced with statistics such as these justifiably concludes that there is something about lower "quality" that causes higher disciplinary rates.

An examination of table 2 should quickly dispel such misunderstandings. Here we see a dramatically different picture of disciplinary losses by mental group, because we dichotomized the population into high school graduates and non-graduates. Among the high school graduates, we can detect no large differences in loss rates across mental groups, and for the non-graduates there may even be a negative correlation with the better "quality" people accounting for the higher loss rates.

This is not inconsistent with table 1. Table 3 shows the proportion of accessions who were non-graduates.

Note: No comparisons should be made between year groups in any tables in this section. The only valid comparisons are among year groups.

TABLE 2

DISCIPLINARY LOSSES OF U.S.N. ENLISTED MEN

I. Other than courts-martial

<u>Cohort year group</u>	<u>Cumulative loss period</u>	<u>Loss rates of accessions by mental group and education</u>			
		I	II	III	IV
1968					
High school graduate	2 years	.0486	.0373	.0443	.0544
Non-graduate	2 years	.845	.415	.320	.278
1969					
High school graduate	2 years	.0457	.0459	.0639	.0667
Non-graduate	2 years	.415	.278	.246	.255
1970					
High school graduate	1 year	.0206	.0177	.0167	.0215
Non-graduate	1 year	.372	.207	.148	.242

II. Due to courts-martial

<u>Cohort year group</u>	<u>Cumulative loss period</u>	<u>Loss rates of accessions by mental group and education</u>			
		I	II	III	IV
1968					
High school graduate	2 years	.0006	.0004	.0007	.0005
Non-graduate	2 years	.0338	.0110	.0157	.0097
1969					
High school graduate	2 years	.0002	.0008	.0009	.0008
Non-graduate	2 years	.0189	.0107	.0088	.0077

Note: AFQT scores were missing in some cases. Wherever possible GCT was then used to estimate the appropriate mental group.

TABLE 3

NAVY NON-HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATE RATES

<u>Mental group</u>	<u>I</u>	<u>II</u>	<u>III</u>	<u>IV</u>
1968 accessions	0.02	0.075	0.167	0.388
1969 accessions	0.022	0.086	0.265	0.433

Thus it becomes clear that almost all of the variation across mental group can be explained by the education mix. If we are to make any generalizations about who causes the most disciplinary problems, it would be safer to say they are the high school dropouts rather than the unfairly maligned mental group IV's. Table 4 presents these figures in a format which is more useful for making management decisions.

TABLE 4
NAVY 2-YEAR LOSS RATES

<u>Education</u>	<u>High school graduate</u>	<u>Non-graduate</u>
1968 accessions	0.042	0.333
1969 accessions	0.054	0.256

This information suggests that more effort should be put into finding out which non-graduates are better risks than others. Chances are that this is not a function of the education itself so much as it is of an individual's ability to adapt to his environment and finish what he has started. Note that the mental group I non-graduates are the most highly suspect in this regard. Those who should have the mental ability to easily finish high school but do not, seem to be the most likely to be Navy dropouts also.

Generally speaking, the finding of large disparity between the attrition of high school graduates and non-graduates is not new or startling [e.g., Plag, 1964]; however, these more recent findings strongly suggest that so-called "Odds for Effectiveness" used by Navy recruiters may be badly out of date. These odds are based on data from men who entered the Navy in 1960 [Plag, 1968] and are probably invalid for the recruits of today. The use of these odds during the Vietnam high draft pressure years may have resulted in the acceptance of draft-motivated volunteers at the expense of true volunteers [O'Neill, 1971]. For example, the published odds give mental group I high school dropouts almost equal chances with mental group IV graduates in comparable expulsion categories, whereas our more recent data indicate that the former may now have many times the loss rate of the latter.

How this will change as the Navy evolves to an all-true-volunteer force is not clear, which points up the need for continuously reviewing first term non-EAOS losses so that policy decisions can be based on relevant data. We have found that such loss analyses are virtually impossible from the current data base. The Navy does not compile statistics on the characteristics of accession groups (cohorts) and no detailed breakdown of non-EAOS losses is readily available. For example, we could not get answers to seemingly simple questions such as, "What was the mental group distribution of black high school graduates in the 1968 and 1969 accession groups?" Presumably such data could be reconstructed from BuPers change tapes but this is a laborious process at the present time. Our experience with the loss tapes was that the lags between the actual losses and their being recorded were so large and inconsistent that we had to give up the possibility of making any year-to-year trend analysis because there was no way of estimating how complete our limited data were.

What we feel needs to be done on a continuing basis is to compile a statistical summary of accessions and losses on a monthly, quarterly, seasonal, or at the very least, annual basis. Once this information became available it would be relatively simple to perform frequent, more extensive loss analyses by cohorts similar to what we have done. It is an indictment of the Navy's concern about the quality of the men it has accepted that there has not been sufficient curiosity to institute such quality check procedures before now.

The implications for policy decisions are not clear because of still other inadequacies in the data base. If recruiters have been accepting mental group I dropouts and rejecting lower mental group IV graduates, such a policy should be reversed. But there are little or no data on the number of men rejected and why; thus there is no basis on which to make estimates of how such policy changes would affect the number of accessions. Consideration should be given to requiring recruiting stations to submit reports on rejectees so that better knowledge of the potential population of true volunteers can be accumulated. In times of shortage this would provide better information on where to look for the additional men needed.

There is reason to suspect, for example, that a relatively high percentage of the mental group IV high school graduate population may be from minority groups such as blacks. Furthermore, there is evidence that the reason they are placed in mental group IV is not so much due to any lack of intelligence but to the considerable amount of cultural bias that has been shown to exist in the AFQT [Stephan, 1972]. This not only has undesirable social connotations but may work to deprive the Navy of a sizeable number of good men if they are rejected solely on the basis of AFQT scores. There may be data available from the Armed Forces Examination and Entry Stations that would shed light on this interesting problem, but it is beyond the scope of this effort to pursue it further. Suffice it to say that as a measure of the attributes we are looking for in Navy men, the AFQT is unreliable.

More to the point is the comparison of these loss rates with those of the Air Force. Unfortunately the Air Force loss statistics did not include a breakdown by education and we cannot make direct comparisons of each of the categories in which we have Navy data. There are a few interesting results, however.

First, because in FY-68 and -69 the Air Force accepted considerably fewer non-graduates, the obvious question in the light of the Navy findings is to what extent the different education mix accounts for the different loss rates. We see from table 5 that the Air Force accession rate for non-grads was roughly one-third of the Navy's and their loss rates were also on the order of one-third of the Navy's.

TABLE 5
NON-GRADUATES AND LOSS RATES

	1968		1969	
	<u>Non-grads</u>	<u>Overall loss rate</u>	<u>Non-grads</u>	<u>Overall loss rate</u>
Navy	0.144	.084	0.207	.096
Air Force	0.049	.035	0.062	.034

The question to be answered is, "What would have been the overall Navy loss rate if its education mix were the same as that of the Air Force and all other factors remained unchanged?" Applying the Navy loss rates from table 4 to the Air Force education mix of the respective years gives the results shown in table 6.

TABLE 6
NAVY LOSS RATES CORRECTED FOR EDUCATION MIX

<u>1968</u>	<u>1969</u>
.056	.067

We are now able to make a fairer comparison of Navy loss rates with those of the Air Force. Whereas the raw data loss rates (table 5) showed the following Navy/Air Force loss ratios

$$\frac{\frac{.084}{.035}}{\frac{.096}{.034}} = 2.4 \quad \frac{.096}{.034} = 2.82,$$

the corrected ratios using rates from table 6 should be

$$\frac{\frac{.056}{.035}}{\frac{.067}{.034}} = 1.6 \quad \frac{.067}{.034} = 1.97 .$$

Table 7 gives the percentage of the difference in loss rates that is accounted for by the difference in education mix.

TABLE 7
LOSS RATE DIFFERENCE CORRECTED FOR EDUCATION MIX

	<u>1968</u>	<u>1969</u>
Original difference	0.049	0.062
Corrected difference	0.021	0.033
Reduction	0.028	0.029
Percent reduced	57	47

Thus, we can say that roughly one-half of the difference between Navy and Air Force disciplinary loss rates is accounted for by the education mix of accessions and that the Navy's corrected rates are on the order of 1.5 to 2 times those of the Air Force. Possible reasons for this remaining difference will be addressed later.

A second interesting question concerning the Air Force loss rates is whether the differences across mental group can be explained by education mix alone as was found for the Navy. Since we were unable to obtain Air Force loss rates separately for graduates and non-graduates, we cannot answer this question directly. But we can present some evidence from a previous investigation [Flyer, 1963] that it might be the case.

Flyer's results are shown in table 8. It is clear that the Air Force non-graduates also had considerably higher unsatisfactory rates than graduates; yet there is no discernible consistent pattern across mental groups. The final column in table 8 does, however,

show a correlation with mental group indicating that it is primarily the education mix rather than mental group per se which causes the higher rates for the lower quality accessions.

TABLE 8

**DISTRIBUTION OF AIR FORCE AFQT SCORES BY HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATION
WITHIN SATISFACTORY AND UNSATISFACTORY AIRMAN GROUPS
(Initial validation sample: 1909 airmen enlisting August 1959-May 1960)**

AFQT	High school graduates			Non graduates			Total group		
	Satis- factory	Unsatis- factory	Percent unsatis- factory	Satis- factory	Unsatis- factory	Percent unsatis- factory	Satis- factory	Unsatis- factory	Percent unsatis- factory
91-100	178	12	6.3	14	11	44.0	192	23	10.7
81-90	186	15	7.5	28	16	36.4	214	31	12.7
71-80	191	20	9.5	28	15	34.9	219	35	13.8
61-70	163	15	8.4	38	21	35.6	201	36	15.2
51-60	150	22	12.8	39	35	47.3	189	57	23.2
41-50	141	14	9.0	65	37	36.3	206	51	19.8
31-40	147	14	8.7	74	46	38.3	221	60	21.4
21-30	69	10	12.7	46	49	51.6	115	59	33.9
Total	1225	122	9.1	332	230	40.9	1557	352	18.4
Mean	64.96	61.53		51.75	49.37		62.14	53.59	
	Standard deviation, 21.46			Standard deviation, 20.32			Standard deviation, 22.05		
	$r_{pbis} \text{ .05 } r_{bis} \text{ .08}$			$r_{pbis} \text{ .06 } r_{bis} \text{ .07}$			$r_{pbis} \text{ .15 } r_{bis} \text{ .22}$		

COMPARISON OF DISCHARGES

Our objective in this section is not to justify the Navy's larger proportion of losses due to administrative discharges but rather to investigate what differences in policies of the two services might have contributed to this difference in numbers of discharges.

In order to compare the two services on an equal basis, we first established a group of DoD loss codes, appendix B, so that observed differences would be based on similar reasons for losses.

Utilizing these loss codes in conjunction with service-wide loss data, the observed losses for FY-1969 and FY-1970 were tabulated as follows:

	<u>Air Force</u>		<u>Navy</u>	
	<u>Number</u>	<u>Rate</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Rate</u>
FY-1969	5862	.008	14,368	.021
FY-1970	5842	.009	16,800	.028

These numbers have given cause for questioning the reasons behind such significant differences between "similar" services of approximately equal size.

The analysis in the previous section showed that approximately 50 percent of the differences in rates in each of these years can be attributed to a difference in education mix between the services.

Adjusting the Navy data with this factor results in the following modified comparison:

	<u>Air Force</u>	<u>Navy</u>
FY-1969	5862	9,920
FY-1970	5842	11,088

An examination of the Air Force loss data brings to light several points. First, the Air Force does not include in their administrative losses certain individuals released within their first 6 months of service, who have failed to meet minimum requirements for retention. The Navy does include such individuals, and if we modify the Air Force losses to include them as well, the results are as follows:

	<u>Air Force</u>	<u>Navy</u>
FY-1969	7527	9,920
FY-1970	7636	11,088

A second interesting point is that the Air Force discharges for hardship reasons were significantly greater than those of the Navy. Since it is not obvious that service conditions in the Air Force are more arduous than in the Navy, it seems plausible to assume that perhaps the Air Force's policy of leniency in granting hardship discharges may result in an inexpensive way of separating potential trouble-makers who, forced

to remain in the Air Force, might otherwise be discharged for reasons such as unsuitability, unfitness, or misconduct. If this were the case, and the Navy and Air Force figures are adjusted by including hardship discharges granted by both services, the results would be as presented below:

	<u>Air Force</u>		<u>Navy</u>	
	<u>Number</u>	<u>Rate</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Rate</u>
FY-1969	10,627	.015	10,625	.016
FY-1970	11,235	.017	13,138	.022

Thus, we conclude that a major portion of the differences in numbers of losses between the services could be explained by adjustments for educational mix, discharged recruits, and hardship discharges.

Two significant Air Force policies which tended to reduce their administrative discharge losses below those of the Navy during FY-1969 and FY-1970 were the early implementation of a drug rehabilitation program and the counseling of individuals for continued indebtedness. Although these figures were included in the previous totals, a comparison of these 2 loss categories is presented below for ease of reference for those interested in these specific areas.

	<u>FY-1969</u>		<u>FY-1970</u>	
	<u>Air Force</u>	<u>Navy</u>	<u>Air Force</u>	<u>Navy</u>
Drugs	340	1751	236	2464
Debts	152	700	133	1316

EFFECTS OF SERVICE TRADITIONS AND POLICIES

As has been shown, a large portion of the difference in loss rates can be explained by educational mix and categorization. In addition, it appears that Air Force policies regarding losses result in less costly methods of discharging noneffective individuals. Information regarding personnel policies in the Air Force was collected in conjunction with a trip to the Air Force Personnel Headquarters.

On 6 and 7 December, we visited a number of Air Force commands located at Randolph AFB, San Antonio, Texas. Our host was Maj. Robert Coldwater, of the Management and Procedures Branch, Military Personnel Center. Through him, we contacted representatives from the Air Force Recruiting Service, Training Command, Judge Advocate General's office, and various operational activities on the base. We also called on Col. Hoyt S. Vandenburg, Jr., the Wing (base) Commander.

We found that numerous differences exist between Navy and Air Force discipline procedures and policies. The administrative chain which operates the Air Force discipline system operates as follows. At the top is the Wing or base Commander. He is an operational commander, who holds General Court Martial authority (comparable to a Fleet Air Commander at a Naval Air Station) and also Administrative Discharge authority. Under him is the Group Commander, a full colonel, who is specifically charged with the house-keeping functions of the base (as a Commanding Officer of a Naval Air Station would be).

These functions are actually performed by numerous divisions (e.g., transportation, security, mess hall, etc.), each headed by a relatively senior officer, who corresponds to a department head in the Navy. The airmen assigned to these divisions, however, come under the command of a major, who is the commander of the Headquarters Squadron. Unlike his Navy counterpart, this commander has Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) Article 15 authority, but is not responsible for the operational performance of the divisions and hence of the men he commands. If the analogy of the Naval Air Station is pursued, the Squadron Commander is in some ways equivalent to a Station Executive Officer with authority to hold Mast. Other Squadron Commanders on the base (aircraft maintenance, communications, hospital, pilot training, etc.) do have both operational and administrative authority over their assigned personnel, but within these squadrons there is also great decentralization. A feature of this organization which has no direct Navy counterpart is the First Sergeant/non-commissioned officer-in-charge (NCOIC) network. Each squadron commander has assigned as his assistant a senior airman (E-7 or higher) who holds a job specialty code for this duty. He combines the functions of both the Executive Officer and Senior Enlisted Advisor (Leading Chief) in the Navy. Each functional division/department also has a NCOIC, who works closely with the First Sergeant. The influence of these persons in the Air Force discipline system is extremely great, as can be seen in the following examples.

Suppose that an E-4 airman reports for his assigned duty at the motor pool one hour late. We were told that if it was his first offense, the matter would probably be ended with his being admonished by his immediate supervisor. If, however, the offense is repeated, he would be called in for formal counseling by the transportation NCOIC. The session would be documented by completing and filing a written report (see appendix C). If the offense is repeated, the transportation NCOIC would either continue counseling or send the man to see the First Sergeant. Another counseling form would be filed in any event. At the squadron level, the decision may be made to issue the airman an administrative letter of reprimand (see appendix D for a sample), which is acknowledged and entered into the airman's record with the counseling forms.

Finally, if the man is late again, the transportation officer would probably recommend non-judicial punishment (NJP). The procedures for this are elaborate. The case and previous record would be referred to the base Judge Advocate General (JAG) for review. A letter signifying the Squadron Commander's intent to invoke Article 15 would be issued. We were told that the most usual punishment is a suspended reduction and a fine.

Of course, if the initial offense were more serious or if the man's attitude warranted, Article 15 could have been invoked much earlier, or even a special court-martial convened (Air Force policy is not to bother with Summary Courts-Martial and almost none are held). It was our definite impression, however, that NJP was considered a far more serious affair in the Air Force than in the Navy. Further, we were told that as a practical matter, an Article 15 punishment virtually prevented an airman from being promoted for a couple of years (due to prohibition of being advanced while under a suspended reduction, lowered conduct marks affecting the advancement multiple, and/or the commanding officer's recommendation being withheld).

An important point of difference is that the case and previous record are forwarded to the JAG office prior to the invocation of Article 15. Thus, the Article 15 authority has

the benefit of qualified legal advice earlier in the disciplinary process than has been customary in the Navy. Due to their greater numbers and wider distribution of lawyers, this procedure can be followed even at much lower levels in the chain of command of the Air Force than in the Navy.

Discussions with Air Force JAG officers made it apparent that efforts in such reviews were directed to determine whether some form of nonpunitive discharge was appropriate. Because of this effort, we expected to find at least some of the difference between Navy and Air Force rates to be made up in nonstigmatizing types of discharges.

At every turn, it was emphasized that Air Force policy is to make early identification of potentially unsatisfactory personnel. The first step is taken during recruit training, where about 2000 recruits a year are discharged honorably, simply on the Training Center Commander's evaluation that the recruit has no potential. Additionally, another 2000 or so are discharged for medical unsuitability, and another 300 for misconduct or unfitness. Once out of training, an airman is still subject at every point in the discipline chain to the question: Should this man remain in the Air Force? Procedures for administrative discharge are roughly comparable to the Navy's, except that discharge can be granted by the GCM authorities. Some variation in the policies of major commands is discernible: Strategic Air Command tends to grant many, less severe discharges (generally on grounds of behavioral disorder), while Military Airlift Command sends in far fewer, but the type of discharge granted is usually undesirable.

It was flatly stated that discharges were increasingly being given in lieu of courts-martial, especially for prolonged unauthorized absence. JAG officers, personnel specialists, and line commanders all emphasized their purpose of separating a man before he became involved in serious trouble.

The Air Force does not export all of its problems to the exclusion of either punishment or rehabilitation. Although their early identification of certain types of problems appears to result in considerable economy in the administration of justice, the effort explicitly expended by the Air Force on rehabilitation is considerable. For more than 20 years, selected prisoners have been processed through a formal Rehabilitation Center at Lowrey AFB, Colorado. The success rate is said to be above 75 percent. Each base has a formal rehabilitation program where individuals who volunteer and are recommended by their commanding officer are intensively counseled and carry through a special duty program. Recently, a central rehabilitation center has been set up at Lowrey AFB, which takes recommended volunteers who are not prisoners and for whom discharges have already been approved but not executed. Assigned to the Center for approximately 4 months, they are ministered to by personnel specially trained in psychiatry, social work, and so forth. If rehabilitation is successful, the airmen are returned to full duty and the discharge cancelled. No data are yet available on success rates, but indications are favorable.

Another rehabilitation tool used extensively by the Air Force -- especially for attitudinal problems -- is the Control Roster. If deemed appropriate by a commander, an officer or airman's name can be placed upon this roster for periods varying from 90 days to one year. Such action restricts the promotion and reassignment of the listee and requires that a number of special evaluation reports be submitted.

The question of transfer of troublesome personnel came up. The age-old Navy dictum "don't export your problems" appears to be modified in the Air Force to some extent: transfer within the jurisdiction of the General Court Martial/Discharge authority is arranged in cases where it is felt that a change of supervisor could change a man's attitude and performance. The modular functional organization of the Air Force facilitates such transfers.

Some of the major points of the Air Force program that differ from those of the Navy are:

- We did not hear complaints about being short-handed. There seems to be enough manpower available to permit elaborate leadership discussion programs, General Military Training, formal on-the-job training (OJT), and so forth. The basic philosophy of people-awareness is undergirded by a hard-sell retention program.

- Col. Vandenburg frankly stated that 65-70 percent of his time as Wing Commander was spent on people problems. Time was, he said, where the Wing Commander concerned himself principally with operational problems. Now the Air Force has established a "leadership" school for senior commanders and consciously shifted the emphasis.

- The involvement of JAG officers in most disciplinary and discharge procedures has the effect of formalizing procedures. This, combined with the strong emphasis on rehabilitation, cannot help but have a braking effect on the total number of statistics generated.

- Maj. Taylor in the Air Staff Personnel Plans shop is making an extensive study of discharges with a view to finding personal characteristics that predict failure. He is also looking for recruiters and recruiting districts which produce a higher than average discharge rate. This is called the Palace Quality Study and gives promise of being of highest significance. Some conclusions were due to be formulated by March 1972.

- The Air Force enlists mental group IV project 100,000 personnel for 4 years. About 55 percent of the career field is open to them. Those needing it attend up to 16 weeks of remedial school. This program might lead to a proportionately better disciplinary rate among these people in the Air Force than in the Navy, but deficiencies in the available data precluded any analysis in this area.

- The basic Air Force test battery, called the Airman Qualification Examination (AQE), is administered at the recruiting station vice boot camp as in the Navy. Thus the enlistee knows whether or not he is qualified for the program he wants and so is "self-filtered" before signing the enlistment papers.

In summary, a number of Air Force policies and procedures combine to limit the number of discipline cases that become statistics. Though the influence of each is hard to quantify, their cumulative effect is significant. These are:

- formalized counseling at many levels below Article 15 authority
- use of administrative letter of reprimand
- relative importance given to NJP, though usually it is imposed by more junior and hence younger officers
- involvement of JAG's at all levels
- control roster use
- emphasis on rehabilitation and the "second chance"

- relative ease of reassignment
- early identification of potentially unsatisfactory personnel
- administrative discharge in lieu of court-martial
- extra training effort expended on category IV personnel

COSTS ASSOCIATED WITH THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE NAVY'S DISCIPLINARY SYSTEM

The 2 primary cost elements addressed in this study which are associated with the Navy's disciplinary system are confinement costs and judicial costs.

Confinement Costs

Confinement costs are the result of resources consumed by confining personnel either for pre-trial restraint or as the result of a sentence. At present, the Navy operates 32 correction centers and uses the services of 30 Navy and Marine Corps officers, 1350 enlisted men, and 54 civilians. The result is a ratio of approximately one prisoner for each staff member. This compares with a ratio in civilian juvenile facilities of 2.5 to 1 and in civilian adult facilities of 5 to 1. The staffing of these Navy facilities is not necessarily directly related to the prisoner load, since the number of staff members has remained nearly constant over the past 3 years while the prisoner load has decreased. The result is that the prisoner/staff ratio has decreased from 1.5 to 1 to the present ratio of approximately 1 to 1. This lack of flexibility is attributed primarily to facility design, fluctuation of prisoner load, and the relatively quick turnover of prisoners as compared to civilian facilities.

Based on inquiries to Naval Correction Centers located in Norfolk, Charleston, and Memphis, the cost of confining an individual was computed to be approximately \$30 per day. It is interesting to note that approximately 40 percent of all prisoners are not under sentence, but are being confined to ensure their presence at trial. If the average confinee in pre-trial restraint serves 23 days, as statistics indicate, the result is a cost of \$690 prior to his trial by court-martial.

These figures indicate that an examination of our facility design and a review of our policies regarding pre-trial confinement could help considerably to reduce confinement costs.

Judicial Costs

In order to determine judicial costs or the resources consumed by conducting trials by various levels of courts-martial, statistics were obtained from Naval Stations and Law Centers at Newport and Washington, D.C., the Judge Advocate General's office, and the Navy Court of Military Review.

The computation of representative costs and man-hour requirements for conducting trials by various levels of courts-martial are presented for reference purposes in appendix A and summarized in table 9.

TABLE 9

REPRESENTATIVE COURT-MARTIAL COSTS AND
MAN-HOUR EXPENDITURES

<u>Type of court-martial</u>	<u>Cost</u>	<u>Man-hours</u>
Non-judicial punishment	\$ 19.22	3.59
Summary	81.89	11.75
Special (non-BCD)	263.25	40.10
Special (BCD)	644.29	90.28
General	1615.43	240.33

The costs and time estimates developed in this section should prove useful in evaluating potential costs or savings of dollars and/or man-hours resulting from the implementation of policies affecting judicial action. Two caveats against misinterpreting the court-martial data should be noted. First, the figures are representative, not average, costs. The reason is that policy changes will most readily affect modal or typical courts-martial rather than those that are more difficult or complicated. Second, the more important consideration should generally be the man-hour change resulting from a policy variation rather than the dollar change. The reason for this is that the dollar figure is a secondary effect that results from a change in man-hour requirements. For instance, a decrease in numbers of courts-martial alone may not result in any dollar savings unless the man-hour requirements resulting are decreased sufficiently to reduce requirements for lawyers, clerks, and other associated personnel.

DISCHARGES PRIOR TO EXPIRATION OF ACTIVE OBLIGATED SERVICE (EAOS)

While an individual discharged under normal conditions at EAOS is assumed to have earned his annual military compensation and amortized his accession, training, and discharge costs, the same is not true for an individual discharged prior to his EAOS. He causes the Navy to incur certain costs for his replacement.

One method of examining the magnitude of this problem is to compare the force structure and cost associated with non-EAOS losses to the resulting force structure and cost associated with a situation in which non-EAOS losses do not occur.

Although an analysis of loss data for between-year comparisons is difficult due to time lags in the reporting system, data for fiscal years 1967-1970 were compiled and examined. Cohort populations were then estimated by relating accession data to loss data using length of service as the year group indicator.

The resulting loss rates for disciplinary reasons, unsuitability and convenience of the government, are indicated below:

<u>Year of service</u>	<u>Loss as a percent of accessions</u>
1st	6.1
2nd	4.2
3rd	2.8
4th	1.2

Due to losses in the categories defined above, the Navy must obtain, train, and pay more people than would otherwise be necessary to meet force level requirements in these critical years of service.

In order to conduct a steady-state comparison, i.e., one in which loss rates, costs, and requirements do not change with time, 2 basic assumptions are made regarding the losses. First, an individual is considered as productive as his cohorts until discharged. Second, an individual discharged in any particular year is processed half way through that year. Additionally, we will assume no potential productivity in the first year of service and equal potential productivity in the second through the fourth year. Given these assumptions, it is reasonable that the Navy could then state its requirements for the total number of individuals in the second through fourth year of service. Since the first year is mostly a "pipeline," the requirements in that year fluctuate as the stream of losses varies.

The results in table 10 were calculated under the assumption that losses occur at the same rate as the data indicated for fiscal years 1967-1970 and that the Navy has a requirement for 300,000 effective individuals in the second through fourth years of service. This table indicates that annually 12,612 individuals above steady-state requirements must be recruited, trained, and paid for various lengths of service to meet the stated force requirements.

TABLE 10

	<u>Force structures and costs</u>	
	<u>Numbers of individuals in no loss situation</u>	<u>Numbers of individuals in loss situation</u>
Accessions	100,000	112,612
Year of service		
1	100,000	109,178
2	100,000	103,378
3	100,000	99,437
4	100,000	97,185
Force structure cost (millions of dollars)	\$2,934	\$3,020

The costs per individual in table 11 were used to establish the difference in cost between the two force structures. The \$86 million difference is due solely to the maintenance of the two force structures and does not include the costs associated with the type of discharge awarded.

TABLE 11
COST PER INDIVIDUAL

Accession, training, discharge	\$ 2750
First year military compensation	6008
Second year military compensation	6231
Third year military compensation	7131
Fourth year military compensation	7223

Although the steady-state "no loss" situation is improbable, it does present a situation with which we can compare costs to determine the magnitude of the problem.

Using the same cost model and assumptions, the costs associated with an individual discharged at various points in his career are plotted in figure 1.




FIG 1: COSTS OF NON-EAOS LOSSES AT VARIOUS LENGTHS OF SERVICE

As indicated in figure 1, the costs rise rapidly during the first half of LOS 1 because of accumulating costs of training and military compensation. The costs during the second half of the first year continue to rise, but at a decreasing rate because military compensation is assumed to be the only contributing factor. Since we have chosen to assume that full productivity begins after the first year of service and continues until the loss date, the costs accumulated during the first year are amortized as indicated.

Costs beyond the first year fall below what is commonly referred to as the straight line amortization of accession, training, first year pay, and discharge costs. The reason for this is that we have assumed effectiveness until discharge, and consequently a commensurate savings results because of the decrease in manpower requirements in years of service with higher pay. A similar figure could be developed for any number of alternative assumptions regarding time of loss, cost, and effectiveness. It is interesting to note that holding other assumptions constant, any decrease in effectiveness assumed to have resulted from the cause of discharge will force the cost of the non-EAOS loss beyond the first year, above the cost line in figure 1.

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APPENDIX A
NAVY COURT-MARTIAL COSTS

	Paygrade/ LOS	Time in hours	Hourly wage*	Cost
I. Preliminary hearing				
1. Preliminary inquiry and mast				
a. Report chit	PN1 (10)	.25	4.75	1.19
b. Division officer interview	LTJG (2)	.25	5.76	1.44
c. Personnel officer interview	LTJG (3)	.20	6.63	1.33
d. Executive officer interview	LCDR (9)	.25	8.44	2.11
g. Mast				
1) CMAA	BMC (18)	1.00	5.79	5.79
2) YN	YN1 (10)	.20	4.75	.95
3) XO	LCDR (9)	.20	8.44	1.69
4) CO	CDR (13)	.20	9.74	1.95
h. Unit punishment and service record entries	YN1 (10)	.10	4.75	.48
i. Accused's time	SN (2)	.94	2.44	2.29
		Item cost		19.22
2. Confinement procedure				
a. Confinement papers	YN1 (10)	.2	4.75	.95
b. MAA escort	BM1 (10)	2.0	4.75	9.50
c. Confinement physical	LT (5)	.25	8.54	2.14
d. Trip to correction center	BM1 (10)	1.0	4.75	4.75
Accused's time	SN (2)	3.0	2.44	7.32
		Item cost		24.66
II. Summary Court-Martial				
1. Drafting charge sheet				
a. Draft	LTJG (3)	1.0	6.63	6.63
b. Typing	YN1 (10)	.5	4.75	2.38
2. Signing, swearing, referring and serving charges				
a. Checking and swearing charges	LCDR (9)	.1	8.44	.84
b. Accuser	LTJG (3)	.1	6.63	.66
c. Appointing order prepared	LCDR (9)	.1	8.44	.84
d. Appointing order typed	YN1 (10)	.25	4.74	1.19
e. Signing convening order and referral	CDR (13)	.2	9.74	1.95
3. Preparation for trial				
a. Summary officer	LT (5)	.5	7.57	3.78
b. YN	YN1 (10)	.25	4.75	1.19
		Item cost		4.97

*Hourly wage computed on 1856 working hours per year.

	<u>Paygrade/ LOS</u>	<u>Time in hours</u>	<u>Hourly wage*</u>	<u>Cost</u>
4. Trial				
a. Summary officer	LT (5)	1.5	7.57	11.36
b. CMAA	BMC (18)	.5	5.79	2.90
		Item cost		14.26
5. Preparation of record				
a. Summary officer's record	LT (5)	.5	7.57	3.78
b. Typing	YN1 (10)	.5	4.75	2.38
c. Summary officer's review	LT (5)	.25	7.57	1.89
		Item cost		8.05
6. Review by legal officer of convening authority				
a. Legal officer review and brief	LT (5)	.5	7.57	3.78
b. Typing	YN1 (10)	.5	4.75	2.38
		Item cost		6.16
7. Review and action by C.A.				
a. XO	LCDR (9)	.25	8.44	2.11
b. CO	CDR (13)	.25	9.74	2.44
c. Promulgating order, service record entries, forwarding letter to S.A.	YN1 (10)	.75	4.75	3.56
		Item cost		8.11
8. Supervisory authority action				
a. Legal officer review and brief	LT (6)	1.5	7.87	11.77
b. Typing	YN1 (10)	1.0	4.75	4.75
c. COS	CAPT (20)	.5	10.45	5.23
d. S.A. review	ADM (26)	.25	16.40	4.10
		Item cost		25.85
III. Special Court-Martial (non-BCD)				
1. Drafting charge sheet				
a. Draft	LTJG (3)	2.0	6.63	6.63
b. Typing	YN1 (10)	.5	4.75	2.38
		Item cost		9.01

*Hourly wage computed on 1856 working hours per year.

	<u>Paygrade/ LOS</u>	<u>Time in hours</u>	<u>Hourly wage*</u>	<u>Cost</u>
2. Signing, swearing, referring and serving charges				
a. Checking and swearing charges	CDR (13)	.1	9.74	.97
b. Accuser	LTJG (3)	.1	6.33	.66
c. Appointing order prepared	CDR (13)	.1	9.74	.97
d. Appointing order typed	PN1 (10)	.25	4.75	1.19
e. Signing convening order and referral	CAPT (20)	.2	10.45	2.09
		Item cost		5.88
3. Preparation for trial				
a. Trial council	LT (3)	4.0	7.00	28.00
b. Psychiatric examination	LT (5)	.5	8.54	4.27
c. Defense counsel	LT (3)	6.0	7.00	42.00
d. Military judge	LT (6)	1.0	7.85	7.85
e. YN	YN1 (10)	.25	4.75	1.19
f. Accused	SN (2)	1.0	2.44	2.44
		Item cost		85.75
4. Trial				
a. Trial counsel	LT (3)	1.75	7.00	12.25
b. Defense counsel	LT (3)	1.75	7.00	12.25
c. Military judge	LT (6)	1.75	7.85	13.77
d. Reporter	YN1 (10)	1.75	4.75	8.31
e. CMAA	BMC (18)	1.75	5.79	10.13
f. Witnesses				
1) Division officer	LTJG (2)	1.0	5.76	5.76
2) Leading P.O.	BM1 (13)	1.0	4.94	4.94
		Item cost		67.41
5. Preparation of record				
a. Reporter	PN1 (10)	3.5	4.75	16.63
b. Trial counsel	LT (3)	.75	7.06	5.25
c. Defense counsel	LT (8)	.75	7.00	5.25
d. Military judge	LT (6)	.75	7.85	5.88
		Item cost		33.01
6. Review by legal officer				
a. Legal officer review and brief	LT (4)	1.0	7.57	7.57
b. Typing	YN1 (10)	.5	4.75	2.38
		Item cost		9.95

*Hourly wage computed on 1856 working hours per year.

	<u>Paygrade/ LOS</u>	<u>Time in hours</u>	<u>Hourly wage*</u>	<u>Cost</u>
7. Review and action by the CA				
a. XO	CDR (13)	.30	9.74	2.92
b. CO	CAPT (20)	.30	10.45	3.14
c. Promulgating orders, service record entries, forwarding letter to SA	YN1 (10)	1.0	4.75	4.75
		Item cost		10.81
8. Supervisory authority action				
a. Legal officer review and brief	LT (3)	2.0	7.00	14.00
b. L.O. supervisor	CAPT (26)	.5	14.48	7.24
c. COS	CAPT (26)	.5	14.48	7.24
d. S.A. action	ADM (26)	.5	16.40	8.20
e. Typing	YN1 (10)	1.0	4.75	4.75
		Item cost		41.43
IV. Special Court-Martial (BCD)				
1. Drafting charge sheet				
a. Draft	LTJG (3)	2.0	6.63	6.63
b. Typing	YN1 (10)	.5	4.75	2.38
		Item cost		9.01
2. Signing, swearing, referring and serving charges				
a. Checking and swearing charges	CDR (13)	.1	9.74	.97
b. Accuser	LTJG (3)	.1	6.63	.66
c. Appointing order prepared	CDR (13)	.1	9.74	.97
d. Appointing order typed	PN1 (10)	.25	4.75	1.19
e. Signing convening order and referral	CAPT (20)	.2	10.45	2.09
		Item cost		5.88
3. Preparation for trial				
a. Trial counsel	LT (3)	4.0	7.00	28.00
b. Psychiatric examination	LT (5)	.5	8.54	4.27
c. Defense counsel	LT (3)	6.0	7.00	42.00
d. Military judge	LT (6)	1.0	7.85	7.85
e. YN	YN1 (10)	.25	4.75	1.19
f. Accused	SN (2)	1.0	2.44	2.44
		Item cost		85.75

*Hourly wage computed on 1856 working hours per year.

	Paygrade/ LOS	Time in hours	Hourly wage*	Cost
4. Trial				
a. Trial counsel	LT (3)	1.75	7.00	12.25
b. Defense counsel	LT (3)	1.75	7.00	12.25
c. Military judge	LT (6)	1.75	7.85	13.77
d. Reporter	YN1 (10)	1.75	4.75	8.31
e. CMAA	BMC (18)	1.75	5.79	10.13
f. Witnesses				
1) Division officer	LTGJ (2)	1.0	5.76	5.76
2) Leading P.O.	BM1 (13)	1.0	4.94	4.94
		Item cost		67.41
5. Preparation of record				
a. Reporter	PN1 (10)	5.25	4.75	24.94
b. Trial counsel	LT (3)	1.25	7.00	8.25
c. Defense counsel	LT (3)	1.25	7.00	8.25
d. Military judge	LT (6)	1.00	7.85	7.85
		Item cost		49.29
6. Review by legal officer				
a. Legal officer review and brief	LT (4)	2.0	7.57	15.14
b. Typing	YN1 (10)	.5	4.75	2.38
		Item cost		17.52
7. Review and action by CA				
a. XO	CDR (13)	.75	9.74	7.31
b. CO	CAPT (20)	.50	10.45	5.26
c. Promulgating orders, service record entries, forwarding letter to SA	YN1 (10)	1.0	4.75	4.75
		Item cost		17.32
8. Supervisory authority action				
a. Legal officer review and brief	LT (3)	8.0	7.00	56.00
b. L.O. supervisor	CAPT (26)	.5	14.48	7.24
c. COS	CAPT (20)	.75	10.45	7.84
d. S.A. action	ADM (26)	.75	16.40	12.30
e. Typing	YN1 (10)	1.00	4.75	4.75
9. NCMR		Item cost		88.13
a. Appellate government	LT (3)	8.0	7.00	56.00
b. A.G. supervisor	CDR (13)	1.0	9.74	9.74
c. Appellate defense	LT (3)	8.0	7.00	56.00

*Hourly wage computed on 1856 working hours per year.

	Paygrade/ LOS	Time in hours	Hourly wage*	Cost
d. A.D. supervisor	CDR (15)	1.0	9.74	9.74
e. Panel	CAPT (26)	8.0	14.48	115.84
f. Clerical	GS-4	12.0	4.04	48.48
		Item cost		295.80
10. JAG review				
a. Review	CDR (18)	.5	11.42	5.71
b. Clerical	GS-5	.1	4.46	.45
		Item cost		6.16
11. JAG promulgation				
a. Supervisor	GS-8	.1	5.40	.54
b. Clerical	GS-5	.33	4.46	1.48
		Item cost		2.02
V. General Court-Martial				
1. Drafting change sheet				
a. draft	LT (3)	.5	7.00	3.50
b. Typing	YN1 (10)	.5	4.75	2.37
c. Checking and swearing charges	LCDR (9)	.2	8.44	1.69
d. Accuser	LT (3)	.2	7.00	1.40
		Item cost		8.96
2. Article 32 investigation				
a. Appointment of investigating officer and defense counsel	CDR (13)	.1	9.74	.97
b. Typing	YN1 (10)	.25	4.75	1.19
		Item cost		2.16
3. Preparation for hearing				
a. Investigating officer	LT (4)	2.0	7.57	15.41
b. Defense counsel	LT (3)	4.0	7.00	28.00
c. Psychiatric examination	LT (5)	.5	8.54	4.27
d. Accused	SN (2)	3.0	2.44	7.32
		Item cost		55.00
4. Hearing				
a. Investigating officer	LT (4)	2.0	7.57	15.41
b. Defense counsel	LT (3)	2.0	7.00	14.00
c. Accused	SN (2)	2.0	2.44	4.88

*Hourly wage computed on 1856 working hours per year.

	Paygrade/ LOS	Time in hours	Hourly wage*	COST
d. Witnesses (2)	BM2 (6)	4.0	4.14	16.56
e. Reporter	YN1 (10)	2.0	4.75	9.50
f. MAA	BM1 (13)	4.0	4.94	19.76
		Item cost		80.11
5. Preparation of record and recommendation				
a. Reporter	YN1 (10)	6.5	4.75	30.88
b. Investigating officer	LT (4)	1.5	7.57	11.36
c. Defense counsel	LT (3)	1.0	7.00	7.00
6. Review by legal officer		Item cost		49.24
a. Legal officer review	LT (4)	2.0	7.57	15.14
b. Typing	YN1 (10)	.5	4.75	2.38
		Item cost		17.52
7. Review by appointing officer				
a. XO	LCDR (9)	1.0	8.44	8.44
b. CO endorsement	CDR (13)	1.0	9.74	9.74
c. Typing	YN1 (10)	.5	4.75	2.38
		Item cost		20.56
8. Review by GCM authority				
a. Legal officer review and brief	LT (3)	4.0	7.00	28.00
b. L.O. supervisor	CAPT (26)	.5	14.48	7.24
c. COS	CAPT (20)	.5	10.45	5.23
d. GCMA review and action	ADM (26)	.5	16.40	8.20
e. Typing	YN1 (10)	1.0	4.75	4.75
		Item cost		53.42
9. Appointing court				
a. Appointing order	CAPT (20)	.20	10.45	2.09
b. Typing	YN1 (10)	.25	4.75	1.19
c. Signing appointing order and referral	ADM (26)	.1	16.40	1.64
		Item cost		4.92
10. Preparation for trial				
a. Trial counsel	LT (3)	15.0	7.00	105.00
b. Defense counsel	LT (3)	15.0	7.00	105.00
c. Military judge (includes travel)	CDR (13)	1.0	9.74	9.74
d. YN	YN1 (10)	1.0	4.75	4.75
e. Accused	SN (2)	2.0	2.44	4.88
		Item cost		229.37

*Hourly wage computed on 1856 working hours per year.

	<u>Paygrade/ LOS</u>	<u>Time in hours</u>	<u>Hourly wage*</u>	<u>Cost</u>
11. Trial				
a. Trial counsel	LT (3)	4.0	7.00	28.00
b. Defense counsel	LT (3)	4.0	7.00	28.00
c. Military judge	CDR (13)	4.0	9.74	28.96
d. Members (6)	LCDR (9)	24.0	8.44	202.56
e. Reporter	YN1 (10)	4.0	4.75	19.00
f. CMAA	BMC (18)	5.0	5.79	28.95
g. Accused	SN (2)	5.0	2.44	12.20
h. Witnesses (4)	BM2 (6)	16.0	4.14	66.24
		Item cost		423.91
12. Preparation of record				
a. Reporter	PN1 (10)	16.0	4.75	76.00
b. Trial counsel	LT (3)	2.0	7.00	14.00
c. Defense counsel	LT (3)	2.0	7.00	14.00
d. Military judge	CDR (13)	1.0	9.74	9.74
		Item cost		113.74
13. Review by GCM authority				
a. Legal officer review and brief	LT (3)	16.0	7.00	112.00
b. L.O. supervisor	CAPT (26)	1.0	14.48	14.48
c. COS	CAPT (20)	1.0	10.45	10.45
d. GCM authority action	ADM (26)	1.0	16.40	16.40
e. Typing	PN1 (10)	3.0	4.75	14.25
		Item cost		167.58
14. NCMR				
a. Appellate government	LT (3)	12.0	7.00	84.00
b. A.G. supervisor	CDR (13)	1.0	9.74	9.74
c. Appellate defense	LT (3)	12.0	7.00	84.00
d. A.D. supervisor	CDR (13)	1.0	9.74	9.74
e. Panel	CAPT (26)	10.0	14.48	144.80
f. Clerical	GS-4	12.0	4.04	48.48
		Item cost		380.76
15. JAG review				
a. Review	CDR (18)	.5	11.42	5.71
b. Clerical	GS-5	.1	4.46	.45
		Item cost		6.16
16. JAG promulgation				
a. Supervisor	GS-8	.1	5.40	.54
b. Clerical	GS-5	.33	4.46	1.48
		Item cost		2.02

*Hourly wage computed on 1856 working hours per year.

APPENDIX B

DOD LOSS CODES

<u>Loss code</u>	<u>Reason</u>
21B	Non-potential petty officer material
23B	Voluntary retirement in lieu of administrative action
241	Resignation in lieu of demotion
242	Resignation for the good of the service
246	Request for discharge for the good of the service
247	Unsuitability - multiple reasons - individual evaluation
248	Unsuitability - multiple reasons - board entitlement
250	Class I - homosexual - GCM
251	Class II - homosexual - GCM
252	Class I - homosexual SpCM
253	Unfitness - homosexual - board action
255	Class II - homosexual - SpCM
257	Unfitness - homosexual - waiver of board
258	Unfitness - multiple reasons
260	Unsuitable - inaptitude - board entitlement
261	Unsuitable - inaptitude - individual evaluation
264	Unsuitable - character disorder
265	Unsuitable - behavior disorder
266	Condition interfering with performance of duty
274	Discharge by reason of international misconduct
28B	Unfitness - frequent involvement
28E	Unsuitable - financial irresponsibility - individual evaluation
28F	Unfitness - failure to pay debts
28G	Unfitness - failure to support dependents
28H	Unsuitable - financial irresponsibility - board entitlement
28I	Unfitness - unsanitary habits
280	Misconduct - fraudulent enlistment
281	Misconduct - desertion - trial barred by 10 USC 843
282	Misconduct - desertion
283	Misconduct - AWOL
284	Misconduct - conviction by civil court
289	Unsuitable - alcoholism - board entitlement
290	Desertion
291	Unsuitable - alcoholism - individual evaluation
292	Discharge - court-martial
301	Substandard personal behavior
302	Resulting from decision of service board
361	Unsuitable - homosexual - waiver of board
362	Unsuitable - homosexual - board action
384	Unfitness - drug addiction
386	Unfitness - shirking
388	Unfitness - sexual perversion
41G	Failure to meet minimum requirements for retention
46A	Unsuitable - apathy, defective attitude - board entitlement

Loss code

Reason

46B	Unsuitable - sexual deviate - board entitlement
46C	Unsuitable - apathy, defective attitude - individual evaluation
46D	Unsuitable - sexual deviate - individual evaluation
703	Marginal producer

APPENDIX C
ATC FORM 18

RECORD OF INDIVIDUAL COUNSELING			DATE OF COUNSELING
LAST NAME - FIRST NAME - MI	GRADE	SSAN	DATE OF BIRTH
RESUME OF REASONS WHICH CAUSED THE COUNSELING REQUIREMENT <i>(Give details, facts, specific dates, names, sequence of events, etc.)</i>			
TO WHAT DID THE INDIVIDUAL ATTRIBUTE THE CAUSE OF HIS PROBLEMS OR INVOLVEMENT?			
TO WHAT DO YOU (COUNSELOR) ATTRIBUTE THE CAUSE OF INDIVIDUAL'S PROBLEM OR INVOLVEMENT?			
WHAT SOLUTION DID YOU AND THE INDIVIDUAL DEVELOP AND DISCUSS TO OVERCOME THE PROBLEM(S) AND/OR PRECLUDE FUTURE INVOLVEMENTS? WAS STAFF ASSISTANCE OF CHAPLAIN, LEGAL, FINANCE, MENTAL HYGIENE, OR MEDICAL FACILITIES WARRANTED, AND, IF SO, WERE ANY ARRANGEMENTS MADE FOR SUCH ASSISTANCE? OUTLINE SOLUTIONS AND INDICATE WHICH ONE(S) THE INDIVIDUAL FREELY ELECTED TO FOLLOW:			

TO WHAT OTHER AGENCIES DID YOU REFER INDIVIDUAL? (Personal Affairs, Chaplain, Legal Assistance, Medical, etc.)
(The Counselor makes the appointment with the appropriate agency)

ACTION TAKEN OR RECOMMENDATION OF STAFF AGENCY

FOLLOW-UP ACTION (Outline all follow-up efforts with dates, names, progress, etc.)

DATE CASE CLOSED

TYPED NAME & GRADE OF COUNSELOR

SIGNATURE OF COUNSELOR

DO'S AND DON'T'S OF GOOD COUNSELING


DO hear the man out.
DO treat the troubled person as having worth and dignity in his own right.
DO show sincere, courteous, and personal interest in the man's problems.
DO give the man the facts, whether they are pleasant or unpleasant.
DO keep the man's problem confidential.
DO refer to other activities. You don't have answers to all the problems.
DO make contact for the person with the referral office.
DO follow-up referral to legal officer, chaplain, Red Cross, etc., to make certain that there is a continuity of action and that referrals are completed as soon as possible.
DO take care of your men and they will take care of your mission.
DON'T brush off any problem as being too trivial.
DON'T force decisions on the person - there may be other equally as good and acceptable solutions.
DON'T let him make financial promises without financial counseling without a written budget.

ABEQ

Letter of Reprimand

HqSqSec, 3510th Air Base Group (ATC)
Randolph AFB, Texas 78148

1. Preliminary investigation has disclosed that you did, on or about 5 August 1971, fail to meet your financial responsibilities, this time to the Aviation Finance Company, Universal City, Texas. You have been counseled on numerous occasions in the past about your obligation to remit your self-incurred debts. Your financial irresponsibility can no longer be tolerated. You are hereby reprimanded for this offense.
2. Your inability to maintain self-discipline is detrimental to good order and the mission of the United States Air Force. Your conduct in this case reflects unfavorably on yourself and your ability to perform as an Air Force NCO.
3. I expect that your conduct will improve in this area and that you will not allow an incident of this nature to be repeated.
4. You will acknowledge receipt of this communication by indorsement hereon.


JAMES T. MCDANIEL, Major, USAF
Commander, HqSqSec, 3510th ABGp

1st Ind

HqSqSec, 3510th Air Base Gp (ATC),
Randolph AFB, Texas 78148

TO: HqSqSec, 3510th Air Base Gp (ATC), Randolph AFB, Texas 78148

Receipt acknowledged. 8 Nov 71

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(REVERSE BLANK)